

# **Political Alignments in the 2004 London Elections**

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*Abstract:* In June 2004 citizens voting in London had the opportunity to cast five simultaneous preferences. As in May 2000, the GLA Mayor and Assembly elections allowed voters to simultaneously register up to four preferences, to differentiate between their evaluations of mayoral candidates and political parties, and to signal complex preference structures to politicians. And on the same day in the 2004 European election Londoners had the additional choice of candidates to represent them in the European Parliament. As in 2000, we found that citizens who voted made use of this opportunity in sophisticated and successful ways. The election produced a clear winner for Mayor who met the criteria set under plurality rule, majority rule, and the Condorcet and Borda counts. It also yielded an Assembly with a strengthened opposition but still likely to have a narrow majority governing coalition in the Assembly incorporating the median voter, hence maximizing social welfare on a proximity choice model. The London elections form part of the emerging pattern of British politics in transition under the impact of 'co-existence' between proportional and plurality rule elections, with 5.8 effective parties in the Assembly election and a substantial continuity of alignments from 2000 to 2004 which is quite different from that finding expression under plurality rule.

The UK has embarked on a long transition away from Westminster-model politics and in this process the advent of multi-preference electoral systems plays an important role. In a previous analysis of the 2000 GLA elections we showed that London voters were ‘freed from constraint’ by the mayoral and Assembly election systems (Dunleavy et al, 2001). They used the opportunities provided to them to express a far wider and more granulated set of preferences than had ever been recorded before, either by plurality rule elections in London or by the impoverished preference retrieval items built into conventional, Westminster-orientated opinion polls and political science surveys, such as the British Election Study. Where plurality rule elections and four decades of political science survey work recorded only first preferences, Londoners in 2000 showed a willingness to ‘pick and mix’ who they voted for, with nearly a third casting votes for different candidates or parties. However, it would have been feasible to partly question the conclusions we drew then on two grounds. First, Ken Livingstone was forced to stand as an independent by Blair’s manipulation of the Labour electoral college, which arguably created ‘artificial’ variations of preferences. Second, 2000 was the first time that the new systems for Mayor and Assembly were used, so the established parties, potential parties and voters all had a lot of learning to do. Neither of these conditions applied in 2004. Livingstone was readmitted to Labour’s ranks early from his five-year exile and voters and parties had a much better idea of how the system would perform. In the event, as we show below, there were massive continuities in Londoners’ political behaviour across the two elections. Our purpose in this early paper is mainly to provide the basic information on how the system worked.

### **Voting Behaviour in the Mayoral Contest**

The mayoral election uses a system known as the supplementary vote (SV), which aims to produce a clear majority winner using a method akin to a double ballot on a single day. Voters see a list of candidates with two columns of boxes alongside, one for first preference and one for second preference. Voters put an X in the two columns to indicate their choices, so that there is consistency between the mayoral, GLA and (on this occasion) European Parliament systems, all of which use X voting. The first preference votes for mayor are counted and anyone with an overall majority is elected immediately. If no one has a majority, the top two candidates stay in the race and all other candidates are eliminated. The ballots cast for eliminated candidates are then inspected and any showing second preferences for candidates still in the race are added to their respective piles. The winner of the run-off is whoever now has the most first and second preference votes. The main disadvantage of SV compared with say a double ballot is that voters must have enough prior information to be able to accurately identify the top two candidates – although this was relatively easy in 2004


since the London media accurately reported a relatively close race between the incumbent Livingstone and his Tory rival, Steve Norris, with the Liberal Democrats' Simon Hughes always trailing third (except in one apparent rogue poll conducted by YouGov and heavily publicized by the Liberal Democrats, who commissioned it).

The algorithm in Figure 1 shows the flow-through of mayoral votes for the 2004 election. Just over 1.9 million votes were cast in the mayoral race, with 56,874 votes (2.9%) found invalid in the first stage count. Of the first ballot votes, nearly 1.23 million were cast for Livingstone and Norris (65.8%) with just under 0.64 million (34.1%) cast for the remaining candidates. In an apparent serious collapse of vote-recording capabilities, there are gaps in the official data available on how the voters for different candidates used their second preference choices, a worrying decline compared with the information available in 2000, specifically on how many people did not vote again or voted twice for the same candidate. (Although the SV ballot design allows for repeat endorsements at the second round for candidates voted for at the first round, voters are warned that such repeat endorsements would not count and thus eliminated from the number of effective votes). However, using our survey of nearly 1,500 Londoners carried out in the immediate aftermath of the GLA elections, we were able to estimate the behaviour of voters whose first preference was for the eight eliminated candidates (C3—C10). Here we estimate that just over 82,000 voters did not cast a second preference, resulting in 560,000 eligible second round votes. This compares with the 2000 elections official data, when there were 580,000 votes cast for candidates outside the top two, with 90,000 no second votes. Thus we estimate that the proportion of eliminated candidate voters not casting a second preference was 13.2%<sup>1</sup> in 2004, compared with 15% in 2000, showing a small improvement in voters using the system.

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<sup>1</sup> Due to data collection procedures, the number of valid votes and repeat votes was impossible to glean from the spoiled vote totals data provided. To estimate the invalid and repeat votes, we used survey data that asked candidates to recall who they voted for in the first and second rounds. Of the 1,474 respondents, 708 reported voting in the June election with 766 not voting. Estimates were based on voters' recollection of first and second round voting.

**Figure 1: Algorithm Showing Flow-Through of Mayoral Votes, 2004**



An estimated 5.5% of eligible second ballots were repeat ballots (30,800), slightly down from the 9% of repeat ballots in 2000. Candidates outside of the top two received approximately 392,000 or 70% of the eligible second votes with the top candidate receiving 162,000 or 29%.

Livingstone and Norris received just under 1.23 million first votes. Combining the first votes with the top two candidates' eligible second votes, the total effective votes for the 2004 mayoral race is 1.40 million. The effective vote is the total votes counted, consisting of first preferences for the top two candidates in the first round, and second round preferences for the top two from voters supporting candidates eliminated in the first round. Of the 1.79 total eligible preferences, some 1.4 were effective—that is, cast for the top two candidates at some stage. Thus nearly three quarters of the 1.92 million voters in the election were involved in determining the final choice for mayor. This compares well with other multi-candidate elections for single-offices, such as 19 candidate Tokyo using plurality rule in 1999, where the winner achieved 31 per cent support.

Table 1 shows the Livingstone and Norris votes as a percentage of the first preference total, the eligible votes and the effective votes. Livingstone garnered 41.1% of first round

preferences, and just slightly more second round votes than Norris. Livingstone’s 43% of eligible votes is short of the 50% + 1 majority needed, but he clearly surpasses this threshold in terms of effective votes gained, with 54.7% support. While Livingstone beat Norris with ease on the first vote, the incumbent only narrowly edged ahead of Norris on second preferences. In terms of the three possible vote totals, Livingstone emerged the clear winner across all three votes, securing a majority with the effective vote.

**Table 1: Top Two Candidates’ Share of Total, Eligible, and Effective Votes in the Mayoral Election**

		Percent of		
	Votes	First Round Votes	Eligible Votes	Effective Votes
<b>Livingstone first preference votes</b>	685,548	36.7	38.3	48.9
<b>Plus Livingstone second preferences (C3...C10)</b>	81,600	4.3	4.5	5.8
<b>Total Livingstone</b>	767,148	41.1	42.9	54.7
<b>Norris first preference votes</b>	542,423	29.1	30.3	38.7
<b>Plus Norris second preferences (C3...C10)</b>	78,400	4.2	4.3	5.6
<b>Total Norris</b>	620,823	33.3	34.7	44.3
<b>Livingstone lead</b>	146,325	7.8	8.5	10.4

Table 2 shows the first, second and combined round votes for the top five candidates excluding repeat second votes from those voters endorsing their first round preference again in the second round. The first and second rounds produced a combined total of 3.4 million valid votes, with Livingstone garnering more than a quarter of all votes cast. Norris and the Liberal Democrat candidate Hughes received 22.1 and 21.7 percent respectively. Hughes performed particularly well among voters in second round preferences, earning the most votes, and a clear 200,000 more than his next closest competitor Livingstone. Additionally, the UK Independence Party candidate (a relatively obscure candidate called Francis Maloney) nearly doubled his votes received on second preferences earning 12.1% of the

second round vote.

**Table 2: Votes for the Top Five Candidates (and others) in First and Second Preferences Excluding Repeats**

Candidate	First Round		Second Round		Combined	
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
Livingstone (Lab)	685,548	36.7	250,520	15.7	936,068	27.1
Norris (Con.)	542,423	29.1	222,561	14.0	764,984	22.1
Hughes (LD)	284,647	15.2	465,705	29.2	750,352	21.7
Maloney (UKIP)	115,666	6.2	193,159	12.1	308,825	8.9
German (Unity)	61,731	3.3	63,294	4.0	125,025	3.6
All others	173,671	9.3	396,216	24.9	569,887	16.5
Total	1,863,686	99.8	1,591,455	99.9	3,455,141	99.9

Turning to how voters employed second preferences, we are able to cross-tabulate first by second preferences for the mayoral vote from the official election results produced by London Elects (note that these results exclude repeat votes). Table 3 below covers all of the 1,447,727 voters who cast two valid preferences. It shows how supporters of the top five mayoral candidates at first preference stage cast their second preference votes:


**Table 3. How Voters for the Top Five Mayoral Candidates Cast their Second Preference Votes, 2004**

1 <sup>st</sup> choice:	2 <sup>nd</sup> Preference vote:						Total
	Hughes	Johnson	Livingstone	Maloney	Norris	Other	
<b>Hughes</b>		17.6	33.9	8.3	26.0	14.2	100.0
<b>Johnson</b>	27.0		38.1	6.4	9.0	19.5	100.0
<b>Livingstone</b>	45.5	21.7		4.8	11.9	16.1	100.0
<b>Maloney</b>	14.0	7.5	10.1		35.7	32.7	100.0
<b>Norris</b>	40.2	7.7	10.5	26.8		14.8	100.0

This table enables us to calculate the net flows from the top five candidates at the first stage to others among top candidates at the second stage. In the second stage vote, many votes are offsetting; some people of type A vote B, but the effect of their switch can be partly or wholly counteracted by voters of type B who vote B. So what matters is the net flow of votes, the balance of the two shifts between A and B. Figure 2 below shows the net flows of the

vote amongst the top five candidates at the second round stage; that is, using the figures above calculated as percentages of the overall total of second preferences cast. As in 2000, Livingstone's strong lead over his rivals means that he is the only net exporter of votes to all other candidates and Johnson's poor first round showing means that he is the only net importer of votes. Maloney exports a few votes to Hughes and Johnson and more (1.5 per cent of the total) to Leppert, the BNP candidate. Hughes received the greatest boost at the second stage (16 per cent), just less than the Liberal Democrat candidate in 2000. Johnson received 10.5, only slightly less than he did in 2000. As runner-up for the second time, Norris net exported votes to everyone else, except Livingstone.

**Figure 2. Net flows of the vote between the top five candidates, as percentages of all second preferences, 2004**



Ascertaining party allegiances and loyalty in the 2004 election is important especially because of Livingstone’s return to the Labour party after running as an independent candidate in the 2000 mayoral race. For the 2000 election, we evaluated party loyalty using respondents’ recalled 1997 general election vote and found that Livingstone attracted a clear majority of 1997 recalled Labour voters’ first preferences and rivalled Kramer in first preferences for Liberal Democrats. Although the use of recalled votes is subject to a degree of construction by respondents, the variable is nonetheless useful in ascertaining party loyalties. In 2004, we did not ask the ‘recall’ question but had various indicators of voters’ party allegiances, including the two items shown in Table 4 below, one recovering party identification and the other general election voting intention. Both items showed much stronger Labour support than was actually expressed in the London voting, and put the Conservatives in a much weaker position.

Table 4 reveals the preferences for 2004 candidates by expressed party-identification. Those identifying themselves as Labour appear to have been most loyal to their mayoral candidate, with a total of 96 per cent putting Livingstone first or second. For Conservatives, the equivalent figure was 87 per cent. Liberal Democrat voters were somewhat less loyal to Hughes, with 80 per cent putting him first or second.

**Table 4: How Respondents’ Expressing Party Identification Split their First and Second Preferences Across the Top Three Mayoral Candidates in 2004, by Party Identification**

<i>Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat or what?</i>											
	Livingstone		Norris		Hughes		Others		None		Total*
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	
Labour (34.7%)	81	15	3	9	6	21	7	13	3	28	100
Conservative (25.7%)	9	4	75	12	4	22	5	17	1	27	100
Liberal Dem (14.6%)	17	24	4	11	64	16	6	4	9	26	100
UKIP (3.9%)	19	4	4	14	7	11			0	9	100
											100
Total (100%)	40	12	24	12	14	21	11	21	5	28	100

\*approximate;--may exceed 100% due to rounding.

Table 5: Borda count scores: to be inserted.

## 2. Voting and patterns of choice for the Assembly

The Assembly election uses a fairly standard ‘British AMS’ system but for a very small body of just 25 members. Fourteen (57 per cent) are elected in local seats (usually spanning two or even three London boroughs) and 11 (that is, 43%) in a London-wide list election. This contest is harder to reconstruct in detail because although the ballot papers were automatically counted like those for the mayor, no cross-tabulation of voters’ positions across the local constituency element and the London-wide party list element was officially published. Instead we have again had to reconstruct how people exercised their Assembly choices from our London Election Study survey.

The basic results of the assembly election are shown in Table 6 below, with the 2000 results provided for comparison. In the local area plurality rule contests the Conservatives and Labour won all the seats with Labour losing one seat to the Conservatives from 2000. As in 2000, the Conservatives were more successful in their use of votes, 1117,240 more votes but four additional seats. In the party list part of the election, Labour gained two ‘top-up’ seats, but were still left two seats behind the Conservatives on nine. The Liberal Democrats gained one seat on 2000, while the Greens lost one of the three seats they had obtained in 2000. UKIP won its first two seats in a UK sub-national election.

**Table 6a: Summary of the Assembly results, June 2004**

<i>Party</i>	<i>Constituency</i>			<i>Party List</i>			<i>Overall seats</i>
	<i>% Votes</i>	<i>Seats won</i>	<i>Votes per seat</i>	<i>% Votes</i>	<i>Seats won</i>	<i>Votes per seat</i>	
Con	31.2	9	3.5	28.5	0		9
Lab	24.7	5	4.9	25.0	2	12.5	7
Lib Dem	18.4	0		16.9	5	3.4	5
Green	7.7	0		8.2	2	4.1	2
UKIP	10.0	0		8.4	2	4.2	2
Other	5.7	0		12.7	0		0
Total	100.0	14		100.0	11		25

**Table 6b: Summary of the Assembly results, May 2000**

Party	Constituency			Party List			Overall seats
	% Votes	Seats won	Votes per seat	% Votes	Seats won	Votes per seat	
Con	33.2	8	4.3	29.0	1	29.0	9
Lab	31.6	6	5.3	30.3	3	10.1	9
Lib Dem	18.9	0		14.8	4	3.7	4
Green	10.2	0		11.1	3	3.7	3
Other	6.1	0		14.8	0		0

Comparing the two elections it is apparent that Labour did worse in 2004 on both stages than four years earlier, despite Livingstone's return to the Labour fold and campaigning for Labour's GLA candidates, while the Tories increased their constituency vote share and lost slightly on top-up votes. The combined two-party share of the constituency vote slipped from nearly 65 to just 56 per cent, and their combined top-up stage vote fell from 59 to 54 per cent. The Liberal Democrats built up both their vote shares, and gained an extra seat in the process. In addition there was a considerable change in the fragmentation of the remainder vote with the arrival of UKIP and the dropping out of some small parties that contexted the first election in 2000. The best available way of summing up these changes is to look at the effective number of parties (ENP) index, shown in Table 7, where we compare 2004 with 2000 and with a projection of Londoners' alignments taken from the 1997 general election pattern (which did not change much in 2001). The ENPv measure increased from 4.7 in 2000 to 5.8 parties in 2004, reflecting the Labour decline and the consolidation of the Liberal Democrat, UKIP and BNP votes. Effectively then London is at least a six party system (Labour, Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Greens, UKIP, BNP, plus perhaps Respect as a hard-left alternative, if it survives another election). This contrasts strongly with the three party system recorded in general election voting. In terms of seats the ENP also grew to represent five parties in the Assembly with UKIP's arrival. Despite the presence of the 5 per cent legal threshold at the top-up votes stage, the extent to which the electoral system reduced the number of parties declined. If the BNP (on 4.7 per cent in 2004) should win representation in 2008 (as seems possible) then RRP might decline further. If Respect (on 4.6 per cent) survives to 2008 and could hold its vote, it too would be well-placed to pass the legal threshold.

**Table 7: The effective number of parties (ENP) and relative reduction in parties (RRP) in the London Assembly elections 2000 and 2004, compared with a 1997 votes-based projection**

	<b>ENP Votes</b>	<b>ENP seats</b>	<b>RRP</b>
<b>2004</b>	5.8	3.8	34
<b>2000</b>	4.7	3.3	40
<b>(1997 projection)</b>	2.7	2.6	6

*Notes to Table 2: - The 1997 projections is derived from Dunleavy and Margetts (1998a) for London. Green votes were not separately modelled in these simulations since 1997 Green support was too low to do so. The ENP votes columns shows the effective number of parties in the electorate's votes, and the ENP seats shows the effective number of parties in the resulting legislature. 'Relative reduction in parties' is defined by Taagepera and Shugart (1989) as the percentage difference between ENP<sub>v</sub> and ENP<sub>s</sub>.*

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An interesting aspect of any two-vote AMS system is how attached voters are to supporting only a single party. To assess how voters split their two Assembly choices, we focused on those respondents who said that they voted and could recall their vote for both the constituency and London-wide member ballots, giving us a pool of 624 voters whose recalled votes are shown in Table 8 below. In 2004 the largest groups were the repeat Conservative and Labour supporters, but they accounted for only 41 per cent of respondents, considerably less than the 51 per cent recorded for the same parties in 2000. A further 16.2 per cent were consistent Liberal Democrat, Green and UKIP supporters, meaning that there are 57 per cent of voters who voted consistently and potentially more (up to 3 per cent) from the 'other' category (see note on table). Thus in total we can say that it appears that between 40 and 43 per cent of voters split their tickets, considerably higher than the 33 per cent we estimated in 2000 (Dunleavy, Margetts and Bastow, 2002). It is clear that in 2004 the extent of ticket-splitting did not decline following Livingstone's re-entry into Labour's ranks.

**Table 8: How respondents who voted in both parts of the Assembly election split their votes, as percentages of all those voting both times, 2004**

Constituency vote	Party Vote						
	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Green	UKIP	Other	All
Con	18.1	1.0	2.1	0.8	3.2	2.2	27.4
Lab	0.8	22.4	3.7	2.4	0.2	0.6	30.1
Lib Dem	1.6	2.1	10.1	2.4	0.3	1.3	17.8
Green	0.8	0.5	0.3	4.3	0.3	0.5	6.7
UKIP	1.1	0	0.6	1.1	1.8	3.6	8.2
Other	0.1	1.2	2.1	0.4	3.2	2.9 *	9.8
All	22.4	27.2	18.9	11.4	9.0	11.1	100
N	140	170	118	71	56	69	624

Note (\*): The ‘other/other’ field gives a figure of 2.9 per cent for the overall proportion of respondents who said they both voted and registered ‘other’ for constituency and party list preferences. This percentage contains a proportion of voters who split ticket between different ‘other’. As our survey only recorded individual ‘other’ parties for the party list vote, we were unable to determine exactly the extent of split ticketing amongst ‘other/other’ voters. In any case, as some ‘other’ parties did not stand in all constituencies, the figure does not always have the same meaning for these voters.

Assessing the proportionality of the electoral system, as we did in 2000, is a key step. However, there are two possible vote bases and several available indices, calculated in different ways. Table 9 shows the main feasible indices for 2004, with the 2000 results shown for comparison. The constituency election was highly unrepresentative, even more so than in 2000, awarding a massive leader’s bonus to the Conservatives and squeezing out the Liberal Democrats, the Greens and UKIP, all of whom had a respectable share of the vote. The Conservatives remain over-represented after the list vote stage, in spite of the award of two seats to Labour, five to the Liberal Democrats and four to the smaller parties.

To assess proportionality we use the deviation from proportionality score (DV), the sum of all seats-votes deviations (ignoring the + or – signs) divided by 2. For the constituency stage it is obviously very high but comparing final seats with list votes it is reduced to less than a third. The ‘adjusted DV’ score shows a resetting of the DV score to run from 0 to 100 per cent, allowing for variations in the size of the largest party’s vote share: it is more than three times greater for the constituency stage than for the overall result compared with the list vote shares. The overall relatively high DV score reflects directly the size of the ‘other’ vote in London. The overall DV was however lower in 2004 than in 2000 because the ‘other’ vote

was two percentage points lower. Several of the smallest ‘other’ parties did not stand in 2004 and UKIP whizzed past the threshold for seat eligibility from 2 per cent in 2000 to 8.2 per cent in 2004.

**Table 9a: Deviation from proportionality (DV) scores for the Assembly results, 2004**

<i>Party</i>	<i>Constituency election (% seats - % votes)</i>	<i>Overall result % all seats - average % con+list votes</i>	<i>Overall result % all seats - % list votes</i>	<i>Overall result % all seats - % list votes, excluding ‘others’ votes</i>
Con	+33.1	+6.2	7.5	+3.4
Lab	+11.0	+3.2	3.0	-0.6
Lib Dem	-18.4	+2.3	3.1	0.7
Green	-7.7	-0.1	-0.6	-1.8
UKIP	-10.0	-1.2	-0.4	-1.6
Other	-5.7	-5.1	-12.7	
<b>DV = Total deviations /2</b>	<b>43.0</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>13.5</b>	<b>4.1</b>
Adjusted DV	62.5	13.0	18.9	6.1

**Table 9b: Deviation from proportionality (DV) scores for the Assembly results, 2000**

<i>Party</i>	<i>Constituency election % seats - % votes</i>	<i>Overall result % all seats - average % con+list votes</i>	<i>Overall result % all seats - % list votes</i>	<i>Overall result % all seats - % list votes, excluding ‘others’ votes</i>
Con	+23.9	+5.9	+7.0	+2.0
Lab	+11.3	+5.0	+5.7	+0.4
Lib Dem	-18.9	-0.8	+1.2	-1.4
Green	-10.2	+1.3	+0.9	-1.0
Other	-6.1	-10.5	-14.8	
<b>DV = Total deviations /2</b>	<b>35.2</b>	<b>11.8</b>	<b>14.8</b>	<b>2.4</b>
Adjusted DV	52.6	17.1	21.2	3.7

*Notes: To calculate the DV score, sum all seats-votes deviations ignoring + or - signs, and then divide by 2 to eliminate double counting. Adjusted DV = (DV\*100)/(100-V1) where V1 is the largest party’s share of the vote (shown in Table 6 above). The idea here is that one limit for a democratic election would be a situation where the largest party wins all the seats, whatever its vote share.*

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The key motor for the final DV score is the legal threshold exclusion. If we remove the 'other' vote as in the last column to control for this impact, it can be seen that the deviation from proportionality introduced by the d'Hondt seats allocation system used at the list votes stage is relatively small. It is within the 1 to 4 per cent range that would be the best practicable result for a small legislative body of only 25 members. The underlying DV score of 4.1 here is higher than the 2000 score because of the Conservative's over-representation from the constituency contexts, but it is still proportional.

The Greater London Assembly is an unusual legislative body because of its small size and relatively weak powers. On approving the budget, for instance, the procedure is for the Mayor to make a proposal which the Assembly can consider and if it wishes vote down by a simple majority (13 votes needed). However, the Assembly then has only six weeks to produce its own alternative budget, which must pass with a two thirds approval (17 votes). If it cannot do this then the Mayor's original budget passes unchanged. It should be obvious that even now Livingstone is back in the Labour party, because he only has 7 Labour votes to count on he could in principle be defeated at the budgetary stage, although a non-connected coalition would be needed to defeat him, spanning from UKIP across to the Greens. But leaving aside the budget provision, the Assembly's normal business functions on the simple majority rule and here we can construct power index scores for the parties based on their representation.

Table 10 shows that the Conservatives' seat gains have put them in the strongest Assembly position, with nearly two fifths of the coalitional power, according to the normalized Banzahf score, while Labour's influence has dropped sharply to parity with the Liberal Democrats on just under a quarter of the power. The Greens, who rated a zero Banzahf score with 3 seats in 2000 are now played into influence with only 2 seats in the new situation, as are UKIP.

Of course the limitations of the Banzahf index are that it is blind to ideology, and especially to the links between the political parties created by the way that the mayoral election process operates (and shown best in the net flows of support between candidates shown in Figure 2 above). Thus although Livingstone in 2000 campaigned as an independent he was able to construct a de facto coalition of Labour, Liberal Democrat and Green support that encompassed 69 per cent of the Assembly and which remained generally supportive for most of the Assembly first term. In 2004 Livingstone has firmed up his Labour support but their reduced vote share and the strengthening of the opposition by three seats (one more for the

Tories and two for UKIP) means that he is more dependent than previously on the Liberal Democrats and the Greens for support on key issues, such as changes to extend the congestion charge area and planning policy. It is very early days to know how the second Assembly will work, but the likely outcomes are either a *de facto* Labour/LD/Green majority coalition with 14 seats (56 per cent, so spanning the median voter) or the mayor having to rely his institutional powers with only a minority Labour bloc in support.

**Table 10: Actual and projected seats outcomes and normalized Banzhaf scores for the major parties in the London Assembly, 2000 and 2004 (compared with 1997 projection)**

	<i>Seats</i>						<i>Normalized Banzhaf scores</i>					
	<i>Lab</i>	<i>Con</i>	<i>Lib Dem</i>	<i>UKIP</i>	<i>Grn</i>	<i>Oth</i>	<i>Lab</i>	<i>Con</i>	<i>Lib Dem</i>	<i>UKIP</i>	<i>Grn</i>	<i>Oth</i>
2004	7	9	5	2	2	0	0.23	0.39	0.23	0.08	0.08	0
2000	9	9	4	0	3	0	0.33	0.33	0.33	-	0	-
1997 projection	13	8	3	-	-	1	1	0	0	-	-	-

*Possible winning coalitions are (MWC's underlined, actual coalition \*):*

2004: ConLab ConLD ConLabGr ConLabU ConLabGrU ConGrU LabLDGr\*  
LabLDU LabLDGrU Grand coalition

2000: LabLD ConLD LabLDGr\* ConLD Gr Grand coalition

Notes: We used Brauninger and Konig (2001)'s excellent IOP 2 programme to compute these scores. The raw Banzhaf score for a party is the number of majority coalitions where a party's exit would make it non-winning, divided by the total number of majority coalitions. The normalized score adds up all parties' scores and shows the percentage of total power in the system enjoyed by each party.

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## Conclusions

Turnout in London rose modestly in 2004 to 37 per cent, up 2.6 per cent from 2000, but much less than the change in other regions of England, which significant increases in turnout at the European Parliament elections for 2004 compared with 1999 (even in areas where postal voting was not used). Taken together with the considerable stability of mayoral and

Assembly alignments recorded here, and the modestly improving operations of the electoral system, there are good grounds to suppose that the London political system has reached a fairly mature state, like that in Scotland. From here the system may develop somewhat further towards diverse multi-party politics, if either the BNP or Respect can pass the legal threshold or Green support grows again. Or it may consolidate slightly, for instance if the UKIP 2004 surge is not repeated. What now seems unlikely to change, however, is the fundamental multi-party structure of London alignments with at least a four or five party system expressed in terms of both votes and seats.

Our key interpretation of these results is a simple one. The introduction of five new PR systems on the GB mainland since 1999 has begun to work its magic on the British political system in fundamental ways. The underlying multi-party and complex patterns of British voters' alignments that have long been forcibly suppressed by plurality rule voting have emerged as strongly in London as they have elsewhere in Scotland and Wales. There is no sense in which these results should be discounted or dismissed *a priori* as the product of 'second order elections', still less second order preferences. Instead the results for both 2004 and 2000 suggest that London voters make sophisticated political decisions about how to implement their full preference orderings within the precise institutional and temporal context that they face. We need to set these findings within the wider revision of theory recently called for by Colomer (2005). He studied the introduction of PR voting systems in a very large sample of countries and shows that there is little evidence of the number of parties increasing *after* such a system change. Instead a large increase in the number of parties commonly *precedes* the introduction of more proportional voting systems. There is every reason to believe that the same process has taken place already in the UK. So although in terms of system change we are currently stuck half way, with plurality rule and PR systems co-existing for the foreseeable future, the long-term prospects are for a transition to full PR even for Westminster. On current trends this might occur either after a further process of attrition of the two 'major parties' support, or perhaps following a further de-legitimizing decline in general election voting levels and in citizens' confidence in UK political institutions.

## NOTES

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The survey data reported here draws on a poll of 1,474 Londoners carried out for the authors between 10th and 14th June 2004 by ICM Research Ltd on a quota sample basis. The short interview instrument was designed by the authors, in collaboration with Nick Sparrow of ICM, and administered in the street. Data obtained was weighted to the demographic profile of Londoners, and votes in 2004 were re-weighted to the profile of actual voting in the European election in London.

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